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After Over-Privileged Permissions: Using
Technology and Design to Create Legal Compliance

A NJANETTE RAYMOND, JONATHAN S CHUBAUER , AND D HRUV MADAPPA * ©
A BSTRACT

Consumers in the mobile ecosystem can putatively protect their privacy with the use
of application permissions. However, this requires the mobile device owners to
understand permissions and their privacy implications. Yet, few consumers
appreciate the nature of permissions within the mobile ecosystem, often failing to
appreciate the privacy permissions that are altered when updating an app. Even
more concerning is the lack of understanding of the wide use of third-party libraries,
most which are installed with automatic permissions, that is permissions that must
be granted to allow the application to function appropriately. Unsurprisingly, many
of these third-party permissions violate consumers’ privacy expectations and
thereby, become “over-privileged” to the user. Consequently, an obscurity of privacy
expectations between what is practiced by the private sector and what is deemed
appropriate by the public sector is exhibited.
Despite the growing attention given to privacy in the mobile ecosystem, legal
literature has largely ignored the implications of mobile permissions. This article
seeks to address this omission by analyzing the impacts of mobile permissions and
the privacy harms experienced by consumers of mobile applications. The authors
call for the review of industry self-regulation and the overreliance upon simple
notice and consent. Instead, the authors set out a plan for greater attention to be
paid to socio-technical solutions, focusing on better privacy protections and
technology embedded within the automatic permission-based application
ecosystem.
INTRODUCTION

Most lawyers recall with a level of fondness the series of shrink-wrap cases,
founded in somewhat extensional twists of the law at the time. The law landed on
the determination that a customer can buy software and agree to the primary terms
of use prior to its installation, and as purchasers retain the option to return software
once they see the terms inside the box. The cases slowly came to a somewhat
reasonable line of legal business efficiency.
Fast forward to today’s world, software–at least on a disk in a box–is a thing of
the past, and the ability to download a piece of software is ubiquitous. One might
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assume, those tried and true cases of old still lead the reasoning, but you would
likely be surprised. While downloading applications are still subject to terms of use,
buried inside the download, and rarely mentioned in the fine print, are the series
of third-party libraries installed with automatic permissions–that is permissions
that must be granted to allow the application to function appropriately.
In addition to such libraries, applications use these third-party permissions in
ways that may violate consumers’ privacy expectations and thereby, become overprivileged to the user. For example, Silverpush, an advertising company, developed
a mobile ad library repository that passively listened for ultrasonic audio beacons
to track users TV viewing activities.1 Similarly, Facebook was recently awarded a
patent for utilizing a mobile device’s camera to analyze users’ emotions while they
are browsing their newsfeeds.2 In such instances, these third-party libraries are
granted over-privileged permissions to collect advertising information, without any
notification to inform the consumer. Of course, these are just a couple of the more
nefarious examples, consider an application that provides up-to-date weather, or
traffic, or locations of friends.3 These applications are often drawing information
from other databases–and are aggregating the data in a real time provision. Each
of these external databases–or other providers of data–often want access to the
data, both stored and generated.
While most individuals may be comfortable with sharing such data, individuals
are unaware of the privacy risks they consensually agreed upon. Consumers are
blindly conforming to the blanketed disclosures, while coupled with their lack of
understanding of the inner workings of how their technology may be used in their
daily routines. Thus, we have since returned our society to the days of the
uncertainty of the law in the face of shrink-wrap clauses.

©Anjanette Raymond, Jonathan Schubauer, and Dhruv Madappa 2019.
* Anjanette Raymond is the Director of the Program on Data Management and Information Governance,
Ostrom Workshop; Associate Professor, Department of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley
School of Business. Jonathan Schubauer is an Affiliate Scholar at the Data Management and Information
Governance, Ostrom Workshop; Research Fellow, Center for Security and Privacy, Department of Informatics,
Indiana University, School of Informatics, Computing, & Engineering. Dhruv Madappa is a Master’s Student
studying Cybersecurity Risk Management, Department of Informatics, Computing & Engineering at Indiana
University, Kelley School of Business.
1. See Dan Goodin, More Android Phones than ever are Covertly Llistening for Inaudible Sounds in ads,
ARS TECHNICA (May 5, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/05/theres-aspike-in-android-apps-that-covertly-listen-for-inaudible-sounds-in-ads/.
2. See Minda Zetlin, Facebook Is Patenting Technology to Spy on You Through Your Smartphone Camera
and Microphone, INC. (June 25, 2018), https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/facebook-patents-spyingsmartphone-camera-microphone-privacy.html.
3. See W. Enck et al., A Study of Android Application Security, in PROC. OF THE 20TH USENIX SECURITY
SYMPOSIUM (2011); see also Glen Urban & Fareena Sultan, The Case for ‘Benevolent’ Mobile Apps, 56 MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 31, 31–37 (2015) (describing how the “free Sea Tow app supports boaters’ navigation needs by
offering information about local tide tables, detailed marine weather forecasts, GPS coordinates and bearing,
and speed.”).
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Consequently, it’s time to revisit the approach that was developed in response
to shrink-wrap issues, one that recognizes the importance of balancing law and
business interests. This article will explore a governance regime for the consumer
driven digital world. The paper asserts that regulation must be designed with key
features in mind: legal compliance, technology as a driver, the seamless,
unobtrusiveness, and transparent, processes, focused on creating balances
between business interests and the need to regulate. The paper will accomplish this
by demonstrating consent by design deployed in the automatic permission-based
application ecosystem.
In 1994, the first smartphone was launched by IBM’s Simon Model. 4 It had over
10 inbuilt applications and there was no iOS or Google app stores for consumers to
download additional applications. The phone came preloaded with generic
productivity apps like the Address Book, Calendar, Mail, Note Pad and Sketch Pad.
Although not known as “applications,” but instead “features” these developments
were the first signs of what was to come in the mobile application environment.5
Fast-forward to 2008, the Apple AppStore went live, featuring over 500 iOS
applications. There were over ten million apps downloaded within the first week
highlighting the massive market potential of mobile apps, with numerous amounts
of these applications offered as what many consumers considered as “free.” 6 One
month later, Google would announce the Android Market and would make it
available for Android users within a few months of the Apple AppStore release. 7
Android Market would later become known as Google Play, which then merged all
Android application markets into one store to support the mass market of users. 8
With the AppStore and Google Play Store now serving millions of people
internationally, individual app downloads reached hundreds of millions in the first
month. Applications were soon categorized by their intended purpose (game,
lifestyle, productivity, etc.), which was distinguished by both the description and

4. See Ira Sager, Before iPhone and Android Came Simon, the First Smartphone, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2012,
8:50 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-29/before-iphone-and-android-came-simonthe-first-smartphone.
5. See id.
6. See Caroline McCarthy, Apple: One million iPhones sold, 10 million App Store downloads in first
weekend, CNET (July 15, 2008, 7:13 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-one-million-iphones-sold-10million-app-store-downloads-in-first-weekend/.
7. See Dean Takahashi, Google Releases Details on Android Market Launch, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 22, 2008,
9:25 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2008/10/22/google-releases-details-on-android-market-launch/;see also,
e.g., Chris Velazco, Goodbye Android Market, Hello Google Play, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 6, 2012, 1:00 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2012/03/06/goodbye-android-market-hello-google-play/.
8. See Ron Amadeo, Google launches the Google Store, a new Place to buy Hardware, ARS TECHNICA (Mar.
11, 2015, 2:09 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/03/google-launches-the-google-store-a-newsecond-place-to-buy-hardware/.
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the core functions of what the app intended to use from the smartphone device. 9
The core functionality of applications introduced a need for consumers to be
notified what they were agreeing to when downloading and using a mobile app.
These notification and consent needs formed what would become the mobile
application permission model.10
The article is structured as follows. Part I offers a description of what the
permission system represents for both the Android and iOS operating systems. Part
II then focus on the application technology of permission systems with an emphasis
on over-privileged permissions. Subsequently, an analysis of the legislative flaws
and failings of regulating third-party services in modern technology is then offered
in Part III. Part IV reveals third-party permission practices and violations of privacy
in mobile applications. Part V overviews the current U.S. privacy legislation and
industry regulations in place. Finally, Part VI concludes the article with a discussion
of potential guidelines mobile developers could adopt, and the need for a
sociotechnical & legal reconstructive approach to help provide consumers with the
protections to promote consumer privacy.
I.

H OW P ERMISSION S YSTEMS ARE MODELED: A D ESIGN P RIMER

While basic permission models have been around in some form since computers
were distributed,11 the mobile permission system has been flawed by design since
its conception.12 A case in point is the automatic process by which some permissions
of mobile applications are allowed. In most cases, there are too many permissions
included in an application that do not align with its intended purpose. Even more
alarming, the consumers have very little choice in what the application can access
on their smartphone. The transparency that is provided within notice and disclosure
forms is also presented at an excessive length that is written broadly in legal
language that the consumer may not understand. Simply put, the consumer has
limited choice and control with their information in the mobile application
ecosystem. A more thoughtful representation of transparency is needed if we want
to provide consumers with adequate means of protecting and controlling their
9. See, e.g., Play Console Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/googleplay/androiddeveloper/answer/113475?hl=en (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (describing the different categories and descriptions
for applications in the Google Play Store).
10. See
Permissions
Overview,
ANDROID,
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (“Android apps
must request permission to access sensitive user data (such as contacts and SMS), as well as certain system
features (such as camera and internet). Depending on the feature, the system might grant the permission
automatically or might prompt the user to approve the request.”).
11. See David F. Ferraiolo & D. Richard Kuhn, Role-Based Access Control, in 15TH NAT’L COMPUTER SECURITY
CONF., Oct. 1992, at 554–63 (“The current set of security criteria, criteria interpretations, and guidelines has
grown out of research and development efforts on the part of the DoD over a period of twenty plus years.”).
12. See Franziska Roesner et al., User-Driven Access Control: Rethinking Permission Granting in Modern
Operating Systems, in PROC. OF THE 2012 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY, May 2012, at 224.
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personal information. First, though, it is important to understand the way in which
the permission model works and to distinguish the differences of the Android and
iOS permission systems.
A. Understanding Permission Norms
To uncover the foundations of what makes a permission system, consider the
general formality of asking permission for something. When we do this task, what
we are really doing is providing the recipient of our conversation a degree of notice
to what we are requesting and then waiting for our request to receive consensual
agreement.13 If the recipient party consensually provides permission to a request,
the party who initially asked permission to do a task is permitted to conduct
whatever was requested.14 Similarly, if the party who is asked permission by a
requester does not agree with what is being asked, the recipient of the request may
choose to deny permission from completing a task.15
The mobile permission system generally tries to mimic this formal process, but
with a degree of difficulty. The formal permission process of human-to-human
interaction often entails a single request, followed by a mutual agreement or
disagreement.16 Conversely, the mobile permission process includes several
permissions in a single request.17 For example, if the recipient downloading an
application is asked by an application permission to use a feature, the recipient is
typically agreeing to more than one permission in a single request.
This can be problematic since the recipient is not informed of the additional
permissions they are agreeing to. In the same example, if the recipient of the
permission request does not agree to grant permission to the application, the
mobile app may refuse to download and thereby, render the services impossible to
be used. Hence, consumers downloading applications are met with a “take it or
leave” ultimatum. Enter the mobile permission system and how applications
address the formal permission process.
B.

How the Mobile Permission System Works

Permission systems for mobile platforms are described as “user-centric,”18 where
the consumer using the app makes the first decision about granting permission to
13. See
generally
The
Basics
of
Getting
Permission,
STAN.
U.
LIBR.,
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/introduction/getting-permission/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2019) (outlining
the basic steps for obtaining permission).
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See generally Adrienne Porter Felt et al., How to Ask for Permission, in PROC. OF THE 7TH USENIX CONF. ON
HOT TOPICS IN SECURITY, 2012, at 4 (discussing various platforms’ permission systems).
18. See Mohammad Nauman et al., Realization of a User-Centric, Privacy Preserving Permission Framework
for Android, 8 SECURITY COMM. NETWORKS 368, 369 (2014).
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an application at the installation stage.19 The core functionality of the permission
system is to allow consumers to regulate access to sensitive data on mobile
devices,20 such as address book contacts, location information, and text messages.
These permissions granted by the consumer are then applied to all subsequent
cases of the same app accessing the device. 21
The permission systems of Android and iOS applications were intended to
provide consumers with general notice to what features an application may use
when it is functioning.22 For instance, applications cannot simply access and turn on
a consumer’s camera. Instead, the application must first be granted permission by
the consumer during the installation process,23 so the person using the app can
distinguish if the ability to access the camera is reasonable within the applications
purpose. Whether the camera should be appropriately used is determined within
the reasoning of the applications functionality. Snapchat, for example, would
reasonably need permission to use the camera feature. 24
In a privacy tech utopia, consumers would be given unlimited choice and control
over their data. However, the platform on the mobile device must make implicit
assumptions for the consumer so that the core elements of the applications may
run properly.25 For instance, if a consumer had to accept or decline every function
on an application, the process may exhaust the consumer’s patience and render the
importance of the permissions messages useless. The permission description may
not be read and the habituation of a quick acceptance out of convenience is more
likely.26

19. See Adrienne Porter Felt et al., Android Permissions Demystified, in PROC. OF THE 18TH ACM CONF. ON
COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY, Oct. 2011, at 627 (declaring up front the required permissions, apps allow notify
users about the received permissions).
20. See Adrienne Porter Felt et al., Android Permissions: User Attention, Comprehension, and Behavior, in
PROC. OF THE EIGHTH SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY, July 2012 (“In order to protect Android users, applications’
access to phone resources is restricted with permissions.”).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE, CHAPTER 8
BREAKING RULES FOR GOOD (2009) (discussing information sharing is the primary threat to privacy in today’s
technological society); see generally Android Permissions, SNAPCHAT (last visited Oct. 14, 2019),
https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/a/android-permissions (explaining that Snapchat must be given
permission from user to access camera).
25. See generally Rebecca Balebako, et al., The Impact of Timing on the Salience of Smartphone App Privacy
Notices, in PROC. OF THE 5TH ANN. ACM CCS WORKSHOP ON SECURITY & PRIVACY IN SMARTPHONES & MOBILE DEVICES, Oct.
2015, at 63, at 63–74 (2015) (discussing the effects of privacy notices on participants in a study).
26. See generally Soyun Kim & Michael S. Wogalter, Habituation, Dishabituation, and Recovery Effects in
Visual Warnings, in 53 PROC. OF THE HUMAN FACTORS & ERGONOMICS SOCIETY ANN. MEETING 1612, 1612–16 (2009)
(finding that participants in a study became less alert to the presence of privacy warnings the more exposed
they were to such warnings).
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On the other hand, the consumer may not be sufficiently knowledgeable to
understand which permission must be used in order to allow the application to
function correctly.27 To avoid these issues, the permission system provisions to
automatic approval of different types of permissions at both the installation and
runtime.28 While both Android and iOS use mobile permission models similarly,
each has a distinctively different permission system.29 It is worth highlighting the
core differences in the two major mobile ecosystems. Firstly, the use of intents–a
mechanism in Android which allows applications to internally exchange
information–facilitates a large part of app development in the android permission
environment.30 This mechanism does not exist in iOS, since URL Schemes dictate
iOS inter-app communication. To put it simply, these two mobile operating systems
communicate to their applications differently. Secondly, the developer
environments are inherently distinctive. Android development is encapsulated in
an open-source environment, while iOS is produced in a closed source system.
Moreover, these distinctions create special security issues that could result in
privacy risks.
Since the development process is very different, tackling the privacy issues
ensued by their similar permission models becomes complicated. Within the
Android system, permissions are requested by the application developer,
incorporated into the application package,31 and then approved by the user when
the application has been installed.32 While this may seem simple, it is not. In fact,
the Android Application Platform Interface (“API”) currently contains more than 130
varying permissions the developers can implement.33
27. See Haoyu Wang, et al., 2017. Understanding the Purpose of Permission Use in Mobile Apps. 35 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYSTEMS, July 2017, at 2–6, 31 (“Understanding the purpose of why sensitive data [on our
phones] is accessed could help improve privacy as well as enable new kinds of access control.”).
28. See id. at 4 (explaining certain permissions must be accepted at install time).
29. See Zinaida Benenson, et al., Android and iOS Users’ Differences Concerning Security and Privacy, in
CHI’13 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 817, 819 (“compar[ing] Android and iOS users
according to their demographic differences, security and privacy awareness, and reported behavior when
installing apps.”).
30. See
generally
Intents
and
Intent
Filters,
ANDROID,
https://developer.android.com/guide/components/intents-filters (last visited Sept. 18, 2019) (providing
information on the various types of intents and intent filters).
31. See generally Android API’s, GOOGLE, https://developers.google.com/fit/android/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2019) (explaining the Recording API provides automated storage of fitness data using subscriptions).
32. See
generally
Requesting
App
Permissions,
ANDROID,
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/requesting.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2019)
(detailing the Android permission model).
33. See
generally
Permissions
overview,
ANDROID,
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (explaining how
Android application permissions work, “including: how permissions are presented to the user, the difference
between install-time and runtime permission requests, how permissions are enforced, and the types of
permissions and their groups.”). See also Michelle Atkinson, Apps Permissions in the Google Play Store, PEW RES.
CTR. (last visited Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.pewinternet.org/2015/11/10/apps-permissions-in-the-google-
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Similar to Android, iOS permissions accessing sensitive data are listed by the app
developer in the app bundle. Apps that are linked to recent releases in iOS software
(iOS 10 and later), are now required to include the types of data in a plug-in to store
configuration metadata in order to run.34 Users are notified of the data that is used
by the app prior to its installation and are then prompted to grant or deny access
to that data once the app is installed. Until the user grants access, any API calls to
that data are blocked. However, the user is only notified the first time the app
requests access with all subsequent API calls using existing permissions to access
the data.35
One drastic difference between iOS and Android is the classification of
permissions. Android classifies the most important type of permissions as Normal
and Dangerous.36 Normal Permissions cover areas that protect access to API calls
that can notify users.37 However, Normal Permissions are not granted access to
anything that could potentially harm the consumer. 38 In contrast, Dangerous
Permissions cover areas that control access to potentially harmful API calls.39 In
general, these types of permissions are considered potentially harmful because
certain routine permissions granted could access private information on a user’s
device.40 Therefore, the user’s approval is required to be requested before the
permission is granted41 and the permission can be revoked by the user at any time. 42

play-store/ (“Analysis of over 1 million apps in Google’s Android operating system in 2014 shows apps can seek
235 different kinds of permissions from smartphone users. The average app asks for five permissions.”).
34. See generally Documentation: Contacts, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/documentation/contacts
(last visited Sept. 18, 2019) (detailing the Contacts framework for all Apple platforms).
35. See
generally
Device
Compatibility,
APPLE,
https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeviceInformation/Reference/iOSDeviceCompa
tibility/DeviceCompatibilityMatrix/DeviceCompatibilityMatrix.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (providing
information on device capability requirements).
36. See Developers Guide, Requesting App Permissions, supra note 32.
37. See Android, Permissions overview, supra note 33.
38. See generally William Enck et al., A study of Android application security, in PROC. OF THE 20TH USENIX
CONF. ON SECURITY, Aug. 2011, at 21, (finding insufficient protection of privacy sensitive information and
widespread misuse).
39. See Jon Howell & Stuart Schechter, What you see is what they get: Protecting Users from Unwanted
Use of Microphones, Cameras, and Other Sensors, in WEB 2.0 SECURITY & PRIVACY, May 2010, at 5 (explaining once
an application is granted access, it can abuse that access and gain access to personal information in a user’s
phone).
40. See Adrienne Porter Felt et al., Permission Re-Delegation: Attacks and Defenses, in PROC. OF THE 20TH
USENIX CONF. ON SECURITY, Aug. 2011, at 22 (explaining permission de-regulation occurs when an application
performs a privileged task for an application without permissions).
41. See Adrienne Porter Felt et al., The Effectiveness of Application Permissions, in PROC. OF THE 2ND USENIX
CONF. ON WEB APPLICATION DEV., June 2011, at 7 (“Application permissions offer several advantages over
traditional user-based permissions, but these benefits rely on the assumption that applications generally
require less than full privileges.”).
42. See id.
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In contrast, iOS Apps are expected to encrypt all data in an iOS device. As such,
accessibility to data is based upon the classification of data into four categories:
Complete Protection; Protected Unless Open; and No Protection.43
Files that are assigned to a Complete Protection class offer the most security to
their data, requiring the user’s passcode and unique device identification to decrypt
the data. Moreover, the data in this class are inaccessible once the user locks the
device, making all data protected until the user unlocks the device again. The
Protected Unless Open class–a slightly less protected class–is used for files that
continue to run even while the device is locked. This function is used by apps that
run in the background to perform certain operations, such as maintenance and data
analytics. The No Protection Class offers the least security to the data assigned to it
since any key required to decrypt a file in this class is stored in device memory. 44
While these automatic permission are sometimes necessary,45 these permission
are also interconnected with third-party services embedded in the application.46
These third-party services contain Software Development Kits that developers
include in their application.47 The majority of the time, these additional software
packages are necessary to maintain and operate the application. 48 However, in
other instances, third-party services are collecting advertising and behavioral
analytics.49 The consumer is not notified of whom or what these third-parties will
be collecting, since the permission is granted automatically at the installation

43. See
iOS
Security:
iOS
12.3,
APPLE
19–20
https://www.apple.com/business/site/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2019) (“When a new
file is created on an iOS device, it’s assigned a class by the app that creates it. Each class uses different policies
to determine when the data is accessible.”).
44. See id.
45. See generally Patrick Gage Kelley et al., A Conundrum of Permissions: Installing Applications on an
Android Smartphone, in PROC. OF THE 16TH INT’L CONF. ON FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY, 2012, at 68 (finding
that users are generally not well informed to decide privacy and security questions when installing applications).
46. See,
Android
Developer
Website,
sdkmanager,
ANDROID,
https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/sdkmanager (last visited Sept. 18, 2019) (explaining how
to use the skdmanager command tool). See also Ilias Leontiadis et al., Don’t kill my ads!: Balancing Privacy in
an ad-supported Mobile Application Market, in PROC. OF THE TWELFTH WORKSHOP ON MOBILE COMPUTING SYSTEMS &
APPLICATIONS, Feb. 2012 (“Allowing third-party applications to operate within a device holding private
information about their owner can lead to unanticipated privacy and security risks . . .”).
47. See generally Google, Release notes, GOOGLE ADMOB, https://developers.google.com/admob/ios/relnotes (last visited Sep. 18, 2019) (detailing updates for Google AdMob since its General Availability release).
48. Ryan Stevens et al., Investigating user Privacy in Android ad Libraries, UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS 1, 2
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fa2c/7383769184aae4e301f0361758ae2ddb1daf.pdf (last visited Oct. 15,
2019) (2012).
49. See generally Michael Grace et al., Unsafe Exposure Analysis of Mobile in-app Advertisements, PROC. OF
THE FIFTH ACM CONF. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY IN WIRELESS & MOBILE NETWORKS, Apr. 2012, at 101 (providing a study on
the Android platform discovered that most existing ad libraries collect private information from phones that
cannot be justified).
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process.50 For example, Android applications exchange information from app to app
through a process called “inter-Process Communication (“IPC”),”51 which in
practical terms means that multiple applications can collect data and share
resources, so long as they operating under the same service agreement on the same
device.52 As this process became more widespread, application designers
introduced a more seamless process called a “signature permission,” which enables
automatic access to the same resources for applications which are signed with the
same certificate.53 In practical terms, this means signature permissions are installed
without notification to the user.54 Of course, this notice work around was done out
of necessity, as these elevated privileges are primarily for maintenance and
updates.55
In contrast, iOS applications also cross-communicate with other applications in
the background. Apple applications use URL schemes to communicate from
application to application through custom protocols developers define. 56 Similar to
the signature permission in Android, the iOS developer creates a custom URL
scheme which may access other app systems. Once the URL scheme from another
application accepts the handler that is passed through, the app system protocol
permission is granted to access and communicate with libraries of another iOS

50.

See Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, in PROC. OF

THE ENGAGING DATA F.: THE FIRST INT’L F. ON THE APPLICATION & MGMT. OF PERS. ELECTRONIC INFO, Oct. 2009 (explaining it

is practically impossible to opt-out of tracking under the current mechanism put in place by some certain ad
networks).
51. Erika Chin et al., Analyzing Inter-Application Communication in Android, in PROC OF THE 9TH ACM CONF.
ON MOBILE SYSTEMS, APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES, June-July 2011.
52. See id. See also Theodore Book & Dan S. Wallach, A Case of Collusion: A Study of the Interface Between
Ad Libraries and Their Apps, PROC. OF THE THIRD ACM WORKSHOP ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN SMARTPHONES & MOBILE
DEVICES, Nov. 2013, at 79.
53. See
generally
Define
A
Custom
App
Permission,
ANDROID,
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/defining (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (explaining how
app developers can define their own permissions, which allows the app’s resources and capabilities to be shared
with
other
apps);
see
also
<permission>,
ANDROID,
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/permission-element (last visited Sept. 13, 2019)
(describing the component of a security permission and how a security permission may be used for more than
one application).
54. See, e.g., Yuan Zhang et al., Vetting Undesirable Behaviors in Android Apps with Permission Use
Analysis, 9 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. FORENSICS AND SECURITY 1828, 1828 (2014) (explaining that after app in
Android grants a set of permissions upon explicit request during installment, there is no way to inspect how
those permissions are used by the app to utilize sensitive resources).
55. See id. (explaining that the Android framework manages most system resources).
56. See
Allowing
Apps
and
Websites
to
Link
to
Your
Content,
APPLE,
https://developer.apple.com/docudocumenta/uikit/interprocess_communication/allowing_apps_and_websites_to_link_to_yoyo_content (last visited Sept. 13, 2019)
(explaining how universal links allow one app to send small amounts of data direct to another app, absent a
third-party server).
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application.57 Furthermore, the consumer is not presented with any degree of
notice while the data is being collected among multiple applications.
II.

O VER -P RIVILEGED P ERMISSIONS

As previously mentioned, the iOS and Android permissions are intended to provide
consumers with the ability to control their privacy and reduce potential
vulnerabilities in applications. However, a permission system is ineffective at
providing proper privacy protections if developers routinely request more
permissions than an application requires.58 It was quickly observed that the majority
of applications on app stores requested a number of permissions that exceeded the
scope of purpose intended to provide basic app functionality. 59 Developers
embedded additional permissions used for collecting information–like geolocation
data and address book contacts–for tracking and behavioral marketing purposes. In
such instances, these permissions were over-privileged to the applications intended
function and exceeded the consumer’s privacy expectations.
Defining an over-privileged permission would depend on the context of the
application itself and the scope of which the permission fails to align with its
intended functionality of the mobile app. 60 For example, a flashlight app may
reasonably require access to the consumer’s camera on their mobile device to
operate the necessary light component.61 If that flashlight app conjointly installs the
read and write contact permissions, that application would potentially be violating
consumer’s privacy expectations. The intentional purpose of the application is to
provide a source of light, not collect contact information. Moreover, the consumer
may be unaware that the permissions granted are accessing such data. A reasonable
implementation of an application like a flashlight app would only need a single
permission with two API calls—one to turn on and another to turn off the camera
flash.62
In the modern application market both the Google and Apple app stores are
populated with an excess of “free” applications that routinely install over-privileged
57.

See id.
See Alessandra Gorla et al., Checking App Behavior Against App Descriptions, in PROC. OF THE 36TH INT’L
CONF. ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, May 2014, at 1025–26 (exemplifying how certain apps’ governing permission
allows for additional access outside the scope of the permission).
59. See id.
60. See Primal Wijesekera et al., The Feasibility of Dynamically Granted Permissions: Aligning Mobile
Privacy with User Preferences, in PROC. OF THE 2017 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY (2017) (explaining
some ask-on-the-first-use permissions fail to account and provide notification for uses of the permission that
are different from the initial granted use).
61. See id.
62. See id. (“[P]rivacy violations occur when sensitive resources are used in ways that defy users’
expectations.”); see also Efthimios Alepis & Constantinos Patsakis, Hey Doc, Is This Normal?: Exploring Android
Permissions in the Post Marshmallow Era, in INT’L CONF. ON SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND APPLIED CRYPTOGORAPHY
ENGINEERING (2017).
58.
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permissions.63 Asking the consumer to provide permission was initially wellintentioned by the market controllers. However, both Android’s and Apple’s
permission systems were crafted with imminent design failures from the very
beginning.64 The original Android permission system required the approval of every
permission at the beginning of the installation stage. The consumer was presented
with a list of permissions the app would require and was only left with the option
of clicking “next” to continue the installation process. 65 Denying any of the
requested permissions was not provisioned by the developers as an option for the
consumer. If the consumer were to “cancel” the permission list,66 the application
would stop the downloading process,67 rendering the application unusable without
the full approval of every listed permission.
Conversely, Apple’s first release of its iOS 1 mobile operating system occurred
prior to the release of their official App Store. 68 Any prior third-party applications
downloaded by users were not authorized by Apple. 69 As a result, Safari, Mail, and
Bluetooth were incredibly vulnerable. 70 Attackers easily enticed users to malicious
web pages that allowed cross-site scripting and dialing phone numbers without user
confirmation.71 Apple’s permission model would resemble similar components to
the Android model,72 however, an earlier adoption to ask-on-install (“AOI”)73 would
be implemented for users. The release of iOS 2 opened location services to thirdparty applications, but prompted consumer permission first. 74 While the consumer
was granted the option of approving certain permissions, there was limited control

63. See id. (explaining how some apps request for permission the first time accessing certain data and
enforce users’ approval for subsequent permissions).
64. See Jialiu Lin et al., Modeling Users’ Mobile App Privacy Preferences: Restoring Usability in a Sea of
Permission Settings, in TENTH SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY, July 2014, at 199 (“early studies in this area
have shown that privacy interfaces, whether for iOS or for Android, did not provide users with adequate
information or control.”).
65. Xuetao Wei et al., Permission Evolution in the Android Ecosystem, in PROC. OF THE 28TH ANN. COMPUTER
SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONF., Dec. 2012, at 31, 33
66. See generally Paolo Calciati et al., How Do Apps Evolve in Their Permission Requests? A Preliminary
Study, in PROC. OF THE INT’L CONF. ON MINING SOFTWARE REPOSITORIES, May 2017, at 37 (finding that apps have
required more permissions overtime).
67. See id.
68. Joshua Long, The Evolution of iOS Security and Privacy Features, INTEGO (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/the-evolution-of-ios-security-and-privacy-features/.
69. Id.
70. Jim Dalrymple, Apple Released iPhone Update 1.1.1., MACWORLD (Sept. 26, 2007, 11:00 AM),
https://www.macworld.com/article/1060250/iphoneupdate.html.
71. Id.
72. Ashni Sharma, Android v. iOS: Which One Fares Well in App Permission System, OPEN SOURCE FOR YOU
(July 19, 2016), https://opensourceforu.com/2016/00/android-vs-ios-one-fares-well-app-permission-system/.
73. Wijesekera et al., supra note 60.
74. Lang, supra note 67.
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over Location Services.75 If Location Services were granted permission, all other
apps theoretically could access the same information. 76 In response to permission
protection failures, Google and Apple developed newer developer guidelines with
each release of their newer operating systems,77 which required developers to
produce apps with a different permission model. 78
A. Android Developer Guidelines Evolution
To address the shortcomings of the previous install-time permissions approach,
Android 6.0 Marshmallow was released as the 13th version of a newer mobile
operating system.79 The release of Marshmallow was significant, since the
operating system would require developers to reveal dangerous permissions to the
consumer using an AOI80 model.81 The consumer would be provided the choice of
granting approvals of dangerous permissions upon the first installation stage,
instead of the application automatically receiving approval of every listed
permission without consent at install-time.82
For the dangerous permissions, the new operating system would now prompt
consumers at runtime when the application would attempt to access sensitive data
for the first time.83 So, for example, if the flashlight app were to attempt to access
contacts on a phone, the consumer would first be notified about the functionality
and then be provided with the option to grant or deny dangerous permissions. The
decision the consumer makes at that moment is processed for all future permission
decisions for that specific command (i.e. the app would always deny the access to

75. See Press Release, FED. TRADE COMM’N, Mobile Advertising Network InMobi Settles FTC Charges It
Tracked Hundreds of Millions of Consumers’ Locations Without Permission (June 22, 2016) (on file with author)
(explaining InMobi was found to be tracking consumers’ locations “whether or not the apps using InMobi’s
software asked for consumers’ permission to do so.”).
76. See generally Hazim Almuhimedi et al., Your Location has been Shared 5,398 Times! A Field Study on
Mobile App Privacy Nudging, in PROC. OF THE 33RD ANNUAL ACM CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS., Apr.
2015, at 78 (discussing an experiment which includes participants’ reactions after realizing certain apps were
using their location).
77. See Yury Zhauniarovich & Olga Gadyatskaya, Small Changes, Big Changes: An Updated View on the
Android Permission System, in PROC. OF INT’L SYMP. ON RES. IN ATTACKS, INTRUSIONS AND DEFENSES, Sept. 2016, at 346,
349-50.
78. See id.
79. See Ron Amadeo, Android 6.0 Marshmallow Thoroughly Reviewed, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 5, 2015, 12:06
PM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/10/android-6-0-marshmallow-thoroughly-reviewed/5/.
80. Wijesekra, supra note 60.
81. See Guides, Request App Permissions, ANDROID, https://developer.android.com/studio/commandline/sdkmanager (last visited Dec. 13, 2019).
82. See Jamal Eason, Develop a Sweet Spot for Marshmallow: Official Android 6.0 SDK & Final M Preview,
ANDROID DEVELOPERS BLOG (Aug. 17, 2015), https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2015/08/m-developerpreview-3-final-sdk.html.
83. See Panagiotis Andriotis et al., Permissions Snapshots: Assessing Users’ Adaptation to the Android
Runtime Permissions Model, in PROC. OF THE 8TH IEEE INT’S WORKSHOP ON INFOR. FORENSICS & SECURITY, 3 (2016).
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read or write contacts. No further permission would be asked explicitly). While
Marshmallow did allow the option for consumers to change their permission
decision, the initial denial of a permission was buried within multiple levels of
system settings. The consumer’s decision at the start of the installation process
would dictate whether the app could access resources at all future times. 84
The modern permission model of Android applications utilizes an ask on first use
(“AOFU”) approach.85 The consumer is prompted at each first instance the
application attempts to access the data. The AOFU improved the previous AOI
permission model because it gave consumers the chance to deny permissions, while
still allowing use of the application.86 For instance, a chat application wanting to
access the microphone at install-time may seem unreasonable to a consumer, but
if prompted to access the microphone when a voice message is to be sent to a
friend, the intention of the permission is communicated more clearly. The
consumer understands that the permission is necessary to properly implement the
function the app is attempting to use, while maintaining a reasonable degree of
context to the functionally of the applications purpose. The consumer is provided a
better understanding of the features that the permission enables and has more
contextual information to be informed when making a decision.
B.

iOS Developer Guideline Evolution

Prior to iOS 4, users had no per-app control over the Location Services function. If
the user had the Location Services function turned on, all other apps could access
that information as well. Besides not prompting user permission first, it did not
indicate if another app was tracking user location.87
Fast-forward to iOS 10, when the third-party apps downloaded by users did not
ask the user for permissions, even if the app was accessing user data. 88 The release
of iOS 10 saw some major changes to app permissions, increasing the responsibility
of app developers by adding a requirement that developers would need to provide
a description for any requested permissions of user data. 89 When downloaded,
accessing its API will launch a permission prompt to the user (or crash if no
description is given). This includes the use of Bluetooth sharing, camera, location,
contacts, and others.90

84. See Ahmed Alaa Al-Hamami & Mohammad Nassar, Future Challenges in Android, 5 INT’L J. OF ADVANCED
STUD. IN COMPUTER SCI. AND ENGINEERING, 95, 97 (2016).
85. Wijesekera, supra note 60.
86. See id.
87. See Almuhimedi supra note 76, at 787 (discussing an experiment which includes participants’ reactions
after realizing certain apps were using their location).
88. See Contacts, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/documentation/contacts (last visited Dec. 13, 2019).
89. See
iOS
Security,
APPLE
(May
2019),
https://www.apple.com/business/docs/site/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf.
90. See id.
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Similar to Android, permissions to access data are listed by the app developer in
the app bundle.91 Apps that are linked to recent releases in iOS software (iOS 10
and later), are now required to include the types of data it requires in the Info.plist
file in order to run. Users are notified of the data that is used by the app prior to its
installation and are then prompted to grant or deny access to that data once the
app is installed.92 Until the user grants access, any API calls to that data are blocked.
However, the user is only notified the first time the app requests access, and any
subsequent API calls use existing permissions to continue to access the data.93
With regard to permissions, the OS uses a permission structure that was
designed to prevent apps from performing unauthorized operations. In order to
protect system integrity, all third-party apps are run as non-privileged users that is
partitioned by the OS as “read-only,” which prevents apps from modifying system
files or making unauthorized system calls.94 Third-party apps are also restricted by
iOS APIs from expanding their privileges or accessing files that belong to other
apps.95 So if a third-party app attempted to access a user’s contacts, for example,
the user would first be prompted to provide or deny permission to the app. User
information can only be accessed through the use of declared ‘Entitlements’ that
are digitally signed, which are used by some of the system apps to perform specific
privileged operations. iOS also prevents apps from accessing data from other files
by assigning apps to a random unique home directory when they are installed.96
Apple has also taken security measures regarding its own applications and
programs. Apple’s virtual assistant, Siri, uses an iOS extension mechanism to verify
a third-party app’s permissions before providing it with access to iOS protected user
data.97 In order to prevent any exposure of user data to Apple from information
communicated between a user’s home IoT devices and an iOS device, Apple
introduced ‘HomeKit,’ which is a software framework infrastructure that utilizes iOS
security to protect private data.98
Unfortunately, the newer AOFU permission models do not solve issues with
managing consumer privacy in mobile environments. Blanketed approval to access
consumer data is still processed without consensual agreement. Additionally,
91. See ANDRES KURTZ ET AL., DYNAMIC PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF iOS APPLICATIONS (Friedrich-AlexanderUniversität Erlangen-Nürnberg Technical Rep. 2014).
92. See
Device
Compatibility,
APPLE
(Oct.
30,
2017),
https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeviceInformation/Reference/iOSDeviceCompa
tibility/DeviceCompatibilityMatrix/DeviceCompatibilityMatrix.html.
93. See App Store Review Guidelines, APPLE (June 3, 2019), https://developer.apple.com/appstore/review/guidelines/.
94. See
iOS
Security:
iOS
12.3,
APPLE
(May
2019),
https://www.apple.com/business/docs/site/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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multiple third-party libraries are embedded within the majority of modern
applications. The purpose of these libraries varies: they ease application
development and enable features such as crash analytics, social network
integration, and app monetization from advertisements.99 While these third-party
services are benevolently intended to aid mobile systems, the functionality of such
services are also largely invisible to consumers. In some instances, libraries present
negative consequences for consumer privacy as third-party services can track
behavior without consent, even across multiple applications on the same device. 100
Applications also continue to bury means of reasonable notice and choice with
their third-party services.101 Information overload and use of complex legal
language in privacy policies also continues to reinforce forced consent on the
consumer. What is even more alarming is that once consumers agree to a forced
disclosure agreement, U.S. law provides very few protections against third-party
involvement.102 Moreover, as consumers are unaware that third-party recipients
collect their personal information and the uses to which it is put, there is virtually
no opportunity for individuals to mitigate against privacy harm. To understand what
privacies exist, we offer a brief description of previously defined privacy harms
experienced by the consumer.
C.

Defining Privacy Harms

According to Professor Calo, privacy harms can be categorized into two types of
harm: subjective and objective privacy harm.103 Subjective harm results from
perception of unwanted observation or surveillance, or from a feeling of
helplessness from lack of control over the flow of personal information. 104 An
example of subjective privacy harm could be a consumer gaining knowledge of
companies profiling information from a database that contained personal

99. See Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez et al, Tracking the Trackers: Towards Understanding the Mobile
Advertising and Tracking Ecosystem, in PROC. OF THE WORKSHOP ON DATA & ALGORITHMIC TRANSPARENCY (2016).
100. See id.
101. See James P. Nehf, The FTC’s Proposed Framework for Privacy Prot. Online: A Move Toward Substantive
Controls or Just More Notice and Choice?, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1727, 1744 (2011) (“insurmountable problems
regarding the transparency of privacy and data aggregation practices, the inability to hold firms accountable
for harms caused by maintaining suboptimal privacy practices, and the practical realities and behavioral
tendencies of individuals making decisions about privacy matters in an online environment all render
even an enhanced notice and choice approach to privacy wholly ineffectual.”).
102. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 120 (2019) (presenting an
overview of such standards).
103. See Ryan Calo, The Boundary of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1133 (2011).
104. See id.

82

Journal of Business & Technology Law

ANJANETTE RAYMOND, JONATHAN SCHUBAUER, AND DHRUV MADAPPA
information.105 Subjective privacy harm can be exhibited from the increased anxiety
experienced by the consumer from data collection activities. 106
Objective privacy harm persists when personal information that has been
collected and used against a consumer in an unexpected, forced manner. 107 For
example, identity theft wrongful disclosure of information, blackmail, or a
widespread data security breach, constitute objective privacy harm. 108 It is
important to note, under Professor Calo’s definition unwanted spam, junk mail, and
other undesired contacts are also forms of objective privacy harms, due to the
significant amounts of time and monetary value placed on protecting against these
types of activities.109 As consumers become aware of reports produced by media
and online sources about the massive amounts of personal information industries
collect and share with others multiparty members, objective privacy harm becomes
more likely to occur because of the helplessness consumer’s face in stopping
information exchange.110
In contrast, subjective privacy harm occurs when a consumer’s state of anxiety
is heightened which in turn, may alter a consumer’s routine behavior.111 As
Professor Calo asserts, despite consumers growing awareness of third-parties
actively having access to their personal information, the chance of objective privacy
harm also increases.112 The more third-parties have access to multiple forms of
consumer information, the more likely that a consumer who has been profiled, will
receive unwanted contacts, or be conditioned to external action that could be
potentially harmful.
Third parties have no obligation, aside from certain legal restrictions, to issue
choice as an option to inform consumers as to how they will use and disclose
collected information. What’s even more concerning from a consumer perspective
is that such third parties may also not be implementing sufficient data security with
the consumer’s information. Some of the information collected could be sensitive
to the consumer and if there is a security breach, the harm is out of the consumer’s
control. Thus, once a consumer’s personal information has been collected within an
exhaustive policy notice system, there is little evidence the consumer has read or
appreciates the breadth of the places where their data may end up. 113 In some
scenarios it’s possible that one of these destinations may be in the hands of third-

105.

See id.
See id. at 1131; Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA L. REV. 477, 489–91 (2006)
(developing a taxonomy for privacy harms, including those associated with intrusion and/or surveillance).
107. See Calo, supra note 103, at 1148.
108. See id. at1147–52; Solove, supra note 106, at 532–48.
109. See Calo, supra note 103 at 1147–52.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Nissenbaum, supra note 24, at 7.
106.
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party recipients that use it against a consumer in an objectively harmful manner. Or
worse, with third parties who face a security breach with personally sensitive
data.114
III.

M ULTIPARTY INVOLVEMENT : CONSUMER P RIVACY CONCERNS

There is a disconnect between what is consensually agreed upon by consumers and
what data is collected by third-party members. These obscurities put consumer’s
data at risk. Third-party security regulation varies across different industries and in
the event of a data breach, consumers may incur damages from sensitive data leaks,
with little to no options for recourse. In the mobile app environment, third-party
services also track users without consent across multiple applications and the
extent of third-party involvement remains largely invisible to the consumer. This
section seeks to first identify the use cases of third-party libraries found in mobile
applications. We then introduce media permissions that third parties inherit and
identify instances where consumers lack control of their information. To that end,
we identify data collection practices conducted by third parties that are invasive to
the consumer’s rights and over-exceed the user’s privacy expectations.
A. Third-Party Libraries
Many mobile app developers rely on third-party services for a variety of purposes,
including maintenance, analytics, social network integration, security, and, most
notably, advertising.115 However, third-party libraries inherit the set of permissions
requested by the host app, allowing them access to a wealth of valuable consumer
data, often beyond what is needed to provide the expected service to the app
developer.116 For instance, an application allowing location sharing may in turn
allow the same set of location permissions to be automatically granted to the thirdparty service embedded in its application code. 117 If the same library is used by
multiple applications, the third-party service can collect multiple streams of
consumer data simultaneously from different apps while a mobile device is
active.118

114.

See SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT (2019).
Ziang Ma et al., LibRadar: Fast and Accurate Detection of Third-Party Libraries in Android Apps, in PROC.
OF THE INT’L CONF. ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (2016).
116. FED. TRADE. COMM’N, supra note 75, at 19.
117. See Theodore Book & Dan S. Wallach, A Case of Collusion: A Study of the Interface Between Ad Libraries
and Their Apps, in PROC. OF THE ACM WORKSHOP ON SECURITY & PRIVACY IN SMARTPHONE & MOBILE DEVICES (2013); see
also Michalis Diamantaris et al., REAPER: Real-time App Analysis for Augmenting the Android Permission System,
in CODASPY ‘19 (2019).
118. Vallina-Rodriguez, supra note 99, at 17.
115.
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These active libraries present negative consequences for consumer privacy.119
Most third-party services operate in the background of a mobile device and do not
provide any form of visual cue inside the app to notify the consumer that
information is being collected.120 The general lack of transparency in mobile
systems leaves the consumer with virtually zero means to identify the third-party
services used by their active application, let alone to know what extent those
service are able to collect, correlate, and aggregate with their personal
information.121 As a result, consumers have no insight into how these services
operate or how they handle sensitive data. Moreover, once the data leaves the
device, a consumer is not provided any sufficient information explaining whether
or not that third-party service sells the data to other third-parties.122 Despite past
efforts by academics and regulators, there is still a clear deficiency of consumer
protection rights provisioned in the mobile environment. 123 A collective
understanding of how companies coordinate their relationships and partnerships
with third-parties, where they operate, and what their privacy data sharing policies
are will need to be more clearly disclosed if the consumer has any hope of being
provided sufficient means to protect their personal privacy.
B.

Third-Party Media Permissions

The ubiquitous internet connectivity that mobile devices now offer has resulted in
a drastic increase in mobile applications that rely on multimedia features. 124 These
features rely on high fidelity sensors found in many mobile devices. For example, a
mobile device’s camera and microphone enable a user to capture pictures, video,
and recorded audio files. Apps also utilize other services such as personal voice
assistants, facial recognition, and fingerprint authentication.125
These multimedia features are dictated by the permissions of the consumer to
approve or deny functionality. While these media featured applications offer
beneficial use cases to the consumer, apps using such features often violate
consumer privacy expectations.126 When a consumer grants a multimedia
119. See Vincent Toubiana et al., Adnostic: Privacy-Preserving Targeted Advertising, in PROC. NETWORK &
DISTRIBUTED SYS. SYMP. (2010).
120. Michael Kassner, Take Secret Photos by Exploiting Android’s Camera app, TECHREPUBLIC (June 16, 2014,
7:53 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/take-secret-photos-by-exploiting-androids-camera-app/.
121. See Ashwin Rao et al., Meddle: Enabling Transparency and Control for Mobile Traffic, TECHNOLOGY
SCIENCE (Oct. 30, 2015), https://techscience.org/a/2015103003/.
122. See Shuai Hao, Bin Liu, Suman Nath, William G.J. Halfond & Ramesh Govindan, PUMA: Programmable
UI-Automation for Large-Scale Dynamic Analysis of Mobile Apps, in PROC. OF THE INT’L CONF. ON MOBILE SYSTEMS
(2014).
123. See id.
124. See Vasilios Mavroudis et al., On the Privacy and Security of the Ultrasound Ecosystem, in PROC. OF THE
PRIVACY ENHANCING TECH. SYMP. (2017).
125. See Vallina-Rodriguez, supra note 99, at 16.
126. Id.
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permission to an app, the designated permission also is applied to any third-party
library Software Development Kit (“SDK”) package included in the app. Thus,
consumers are unaware of the extent of privacy risks generated from the approved
permissions they grant access to.127
In addition, on both iOS and Android there is no permission required for thirdparty code in an app to continuously record what is displayed on a consumer’s
device.128 As such, consumers unwittingly use apps that are granting over-privileged
permissions. For instance, an applications third-party library may collect video
recordings containing sensitive information similar to session-replay scripts or
browser tracking mechanisms on websites.129 Moreover, these libraries can
accomplish this functionality without requiring any permission from the
consumer.130 When applications are used, sensitive information is often displayed
by default. In turn, undisclosed monitoring by third parties stealthily captures
personal information of consumers while in session. Several apps also share image
and video data if the permissions that granted functionality to a camera or device
storage is allowed. For instance, several photo editing applications process photo
images online in the background without explicit mentioning of such behavior in
the privacy policy or to the consumer.131
Consequently, large amounts of applications request multimedia permissions
that are never used and include code that uses multimedia sensors without
explicitly requesting such permissions to the consumer. 132 This inconsistency
violates consumer expectation, while increasing potential privacy risks. Even worse,
previously unused permissions can be exploited by third-party libraries that a
developer includes in an app.133 Third-party code that does not provide permissions
to use multimedia in a version of an application may start exploiting any

127.

Id.
See Xing Gao, Dachuan Liu, Haining Wang & Kun Sun, PmDroid: Permission Supervision for Android
Advertising, in SYMP. ON RELIABLE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS (2019); see also Michael C Grace, et al., Unsafe exposure
analysis of mobile in-app advertisements, in ACM CONF. ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN WIRELESS AND MOBILE NETWORKS
(2012).
129. Steven Englehardt, No Boundaries: Exfiltration of personal data by session-replay scripts, FREEDOM TO
TINKER (Nov. 15, 2017), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/11/15/no-boundaries-exfiltration-of-personaldata-by-session-replay-scripts/.
130. See Christophe Leung et al., Should You Use the App for That?: Comparing the Privacy Implications of
App- and Web-based Online Services, in PROC. OF THE INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONF. (2016).
131. See Elleen Pan et al., Panoptispy: Characterizing Audio and Video Exfiltration from Android Applications,
in PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 1-18 (2018); see also Szymon Sidor, Exploring Limits of Covert Data
Collection on Android: Apps can Take Photos with your Phone without you Knowing, EZ.AI (May 22, 2014),
http://www.ez.ai/2014/05/exploring-limits-of-covert-data.html.
132. See id; see also Abbas Razaghpanah et al., Apps, Trackers, Privacy, and Regulators: A Global Study of
the Mobile Tracking Ecosystem, in PROC. OF THE NETWORK & DISTRIBUTED SYS. SECURITY SYMPOSIUM (2018).
133. See W. Enck, P. Gilbert et al., Taintdroid: an information-ﬂow tracking system for realtime Privacy
Monitoring on Smartphones, in PROC. OF THE 9TH USENIX SYMP. ON OPERATING SYSTEMS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
(2010).
128.
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permissions granted to a future version of the app for an unrelated purpose. Such
practices could impose additional privacy risks, since third-party libraries can
potentially load additional code once a permission is granted without developers or
consumers knowing.134
Furthermore, there is an inconsistency between permissions and API calls found
in an application’s intention of use.135 These problems lead to over-privileged
permissions provisioned in large quantities of mobile apps. Therefore, there is a
need for developers to more carefully consider how they request certain media
functionality. For example, an application may have required permission in a
previous version, however, the developer may have failed to update the requested
permissions in the newer version of the app.136 Additionally, the mapping between
the applications permissions and the APIs referenced may be poorly documented,
leading to confusion among the development teams. 137 Also, third-party software
development kits provide copy-and-paste instruction for integration that includes
all potentially needed permissions, even if the app does not use the embedded
library to function.138
C.

Privacy Notices

Privacy notices are intended to provide the consumer the opportunity to control
their information and protect their privacy,139 but often times the consumer does
not take the time to read the notices provided. 140 The utility benefit of reading
policy notices as opposed to the immediate gratification of skipping such
statements and gaining access to services far exceeds how consumers make their
choice. While privacy notices are produced to provide consumers the opportunity
to control and protect their information, such notices are defective because
consumers receive very little relevant information about the involvement of thirdparty services.141 Adequate information that determines who your personal data is

134.

See id.
Szymon Sidor, Exploring Limits of Covert Data Collection on Android: Apps can Take Photos with your
Phone without you Knowing, EZ.AI (May 22, 2014), http://www.ez.ai/2014/05/exploring-limits-of-covertdata.html.
136. See Pan, supra note 131, at 9.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, iii (2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (stating “the Commission’s goal in the privacy arena
has remained constant: to protect consumers’ personal information and ensure that they have the confidence
to take advantage of the many benefits of the ever-changing marketplace.”).
140. See id. (stating “the notice-and-choice model, as implemented, has led to long, incomprehensible
privacy policies that consumers typically do not read, let alone understand.”).
141. See id. at 24 (“Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief of Center for Digital
Democracy, U.S.PIRG, and World Privacy Forum, In the Matter of Real-time Targeting and Auctioning, Data
135.
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shared with and what purpose it is used for are basic levels of trustworthy
disclosure company privacy notices should be willing to reveal. 142 Technologist have
created many types of different applications consumers can use as options to make
sense of privacy notices and the flow of information, however, consumers are
reluctant in effectively utilizing these technologies, and the most relevant devices
are still underdeveloped.143
Privacy notices can’t be improved until the U.S. privacy regime actively employs
effective policy enforcement which requires companies to produce notices that
reasonably allow the consumer to have controlled notice and choice to their
personal information. Additionally, the public will need to take their privacy rights
seriously. Fast acting design options implemented through sociotechnical
enhancements can help simplify privacy notice information in a manner presented
in a more easily understandable and less burdensome format for the consumer to
read. Developers and technologist creating such technologies can help create
incentives that allow consumers to more actively inform themselves about
company notices and take their privacy rights seriously. The public will continue to
suffer from the ambiguity we find in privacy notices until both legislative
enforcement and sociocultural elements surrounding information privacy are
improved.
In order to implement effective notice and choice to the consumer, policy
technologists and legislators must be willing to implement policies that address the
exhaustive amount of criticisms surrounding notices consumers receive. On top of
the notice issues consumers already experience, personal information is constantly
being transferred from one international jurisdiction to another, with drastically
different privacy laws at play. If there is any hope to improve third-party disclosure
issues and consumer control, these criticisms must be addressed. Accordingly, if
these criticisms are not realized, third-party members will continue to actively use
and spread consumer information with very little concern to the consumer’s
privacy.
D. Notice Deficiency
While many sources have noted that consumers do not read the entirety of notices,
it is no secret that the majority of privacy notices are unreasonably long. 144

Profiling Optimization, and Economic Loss to Consumers and Privacy (2010), available at
http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/eb/6c/eb6c038a1fb114be75ecabab05b4b90b/FTCfiling_Apr7_10.pdf.”).
142. See id. at 26–27 (stating “privacy policies have become long and incomprehensible, placing too high a
burden on consumers to read, understand, and then exercise meaningful choices based on them.”).
143. See id.
144. See PATRICK GAGE KELLEY ET AL., STANDARDIZING PRIVACY NOTICES: AN ONLINE STUDY OF THE NUTRITION LABEL
APPROACH 1 (2010), http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/_files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab09014.pdf (determining
that “standardized privacy policy presentations can have significant positive effects on accuracy and speed of
information finding and on reader enjoyment of privacy policies.”).
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Researchers from Carnegie Mellon, Lorrie Cranor and Aleecia McDonald, collected
privacy policies from the top 75 websites and calculated the median length of
policies, with the results showing the median length to be 2,514 words. 145 A
standard reading rate in academic literature was assessed as being 250 words a
minute, so assuming that the majority of consumers have standard reading levels
of academics (which they don’t), then a privacy policy would cost the average
person about 10 minutes to read.146 Professor Cranor then calculated the amount
of time for the average person to read every privacy policy from every website out
of the 75 sites analyzed.147 To accomplish this feat, it would take the average person
a total of 25 days. If reading these policies were to be quantified from a 9:00 AM –
5:00 PM job scenario, it would take the average person 76 workdays to complete
the task.148 Nationally, the total amount of time implemented by all consumers was
calculated at 53.8 billion hours (6,141,552 years) of time required. 149
The opportunity cost lost was even more staggering. Professor Cranor
constructed a hypothetical opportunity cost nationally for reading internet privacy
policies.150 The researchers first split up web surfing between home and work visits,
valued the time spent reading privacy policies at two times a worker’s wage, and
multiplied the time spent reading at home by one-quarter of average wages for
home visitors.151 Professor Cranor calculated the hypothetical national net
opportunity cost of reading privacy policies at $781 billion. 152 For comparison,
Google’s market cap value was $780 billion in July of 2019. 153 Professor Cranor’s
study was conducted in 2008, so there is little doubt that the number has only
increased.154 These statistics alone show how fundamentally broken information
privacy is. This data continues to add to the notion that the collective weight of
policy length does not reasonably allow consumers to maintain responsible
ownership of personal data. Third-party recipients will always be blanketed in
dubious protections if the lengths of privacy notices given to the consumer are
unreasonably long.

145. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: A J. L. & POL’Y FOR THE
INFO. SOC’Y 543, 553–54 (2008).
146. See id at 554–55.
147. See id. at 562–63.
148. See id. at 563.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 561–62.
151. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: A J. OF L. & POL’Y FOR
THE INFO. SOC’Y 543, 558–59, 561–62 (2008).
152. See id. at 544.
153. See
Alphabet
Market
Cap,
YAHOO,
(Aug.
13,
2019,
12:07
AM),
https://ycharts.com/companies/GOOG/market_cap.
154. See id.
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IV.

L EGAL MANEUVERS P ROTECTING P RIVACY

The United States lacks a single, comprehensive federal privacy law that regulates
the collection and use of personal information. Instead, the U.S. privacy regime
relies on regulating data protection with only certain sectoral laws at the federal
and state level. A misplaced reliance on privacy torts has also created overlapping
problems that further complicate the privacy law discussion. The United States
approach to privacy laws fails to address consumer protection, and the related
proposals leave these issues gaping. This section will briefly explore the U.S. Privacy
Protections from the Federal and State level and will then explore several of the
more promising areas of emerging regulation.
A. Overview of U.S. Privacy Protections
There are several adopted sectoral and state laws practiced within the U.S. that
provide specific industry guidelines with different types of personal information.
For example, sectoral laws include: The Fair Credit and Reporting Act (“FCRA”); The
Gramm-Leah-Bliley Act; The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”);
and The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”). However, if the company doesn’t
fall within an often-narrow scope of sectoral coverage, the law is inapplicable to
their activities. Hence, the limited coverage leaves gaps in regulation and often
leaves individuals unprotected.
1.

At the Federal Level

While there are several federal sectoral based privacy laws within the U.S., many of
the protections afforded to consumers under these laws are less than stellar. In fact,
it is often the case that the limited scope of the law provides little-to-no protection
for the consumer. For example, while individuals may assume the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) may cover the information contained
on your IoT enabled Garmin or Fitbit device, in fact, only “covered entities” such as
health plans, health care providers, and health care clearinghouses, fall within the
regulation.155 Similarly, the FCRA only protects as private the information contained
within the files of consumer reporting agencies. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also
known as the Financial Modernization Act, requires financial institutions to explain
company information-sharing practices to their consumers.156 As one can see, the
majority of privacy-based protections are incredibly limited in scope–thereby
leaving a large swath of individuals who fall outside these situations and
environments unprotected.
Moreover, even in the events that information is covered within one of these
sectoral laws, the laws fail to protect information within the current data gathering

155.
156.
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environment. For example, all of these industry-specific laws require “covered
entities” to produce forms of notice and choice to consumers before providing
collected consumer information to third-parties, with the notice and choice coming
in the form of a blanketed opt-in/opt-out approach157 that is deficient (as described
above).158 In situations such as this, the consumer is unaware and is in fact, often
unable to discern entities that will receive their information and has no real means
of discovering how the entity will use the data. This ambiguity, therefore, still leaves
the consumer with little control over their personal information, despite being
offered thoroughly produced privacy notices that followed strictly practiced,
industry-specific guidelines.159
Supplementary to federal sectoral laws, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
has privacy related enforcement powers arising when companies engage in defined
and proximate “unfair” or “deceptive” trade practices. 160 Under this law, entities
are prohibited from commercial conduct that: (1) causes (or is likely to cause)
substantial injury to consumers; (2) that consumers cannot reasonably avoid
themselves; and (3) without offsetting benefits to consumers or competition. 161 As
information technology continues to advance in business operations and
advertising, what constitutes deceptive or unfair trade practices continues to
evolve. For example, the failure to implement sufficient security measures or failure
to adequately disclose information-handling practices have already given rise to
enforcement action against companies.162
Unfortunately, even federal enforcement authority fails to address the
consumer’s lack of control or understanding of information provided in privacy
notices.163 For example, the majority of enforcement activity is squished so long as
the entity can demonstrate the existence of an opt-in/opt-out information sharing
agreement. As previously discussed, these approaches often fail to provide
adequate information to the consumer and provide no meaningful way to receive
services once an opt-out is selected. As such, these agreements are widely used
within industries and thereby leave little protections to consumers.

157.

GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6808 (2012).
See supra discussion accompanying notes 155–57.
159. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 50.
160. See PETER SWIRE & SOL BERMANN, INFORMATION PRIVACY 70 (2007).
161. Federal Trade Comm’n Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
162. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Sears Settles FTC Charges Regarding Tracking Software (Jun. 4,
2009), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/sears.shtm (agreeing that Sears “failed to disclose adequately the
scope of consumers’ personal information it collected via a downloadable software application.”).
163. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, GATEWAY LEARNING SETTLES FTC PRIVACY CHARGES (2004),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2004/07/gateway-learning-settles-ftc-privacy-charges
(agreeing that Gateway “violated federal law when it rented consumers’ personal information to target
marketers”).
158.
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2.

At the State Level

From an information privacy perspective, state statutory law also provides very
little assistance to the consumer. With the exception of California’s “Shine the Light
Law,” and the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”)164 no other state requires
companies to provide consumers disclosure of information with their informationsharing practices or a list of companies they share consumers information with for
advertising purposes.165 So long as companies provide consumers with an opt-in or
opt-out mechanism and the consumer is not a California resident, companies are
not required by law to disclose the third-parties with which a company shares
information with or provide access rights to the consumers they collect from.166
Consequently, the majority of states in the United States do not even require
companies to develop privacy policies or any kind of useful notice and choice the
consumers may read.167 As previously mentioned, the most promising form of state
statutory law can be exemplified with California’s “Shine the Light Law” and
CCPA.168 California’s information privacy laws require companies to disclose their
information-sharing practices to consumers and, if requested by the consumer, 169
companies are required to disclose consumers with a list of third-party members
they have shared the consumer’s information with. 170 Other notable state laws
include Utah’s statutory adoptions,171 which require certain companies to disclose
to consumers what type of information they may disclose to third-parties.172
Connecticut has also required privacy policies to be posted in the event that entities
collect social security numbers.173
While these state laws are a step in the right direction for consumers’
information privacy, most of these state statues do not require notice and choice
about the specific third-parties to be included in their privacy policies.174 Even if
California’s “Shine the Light” statute does not mandate active third-party listing and

164. Examining Safeguards for Consumer Data Privacy Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science &
Transp., 115th Cong. (2018).
165. Clark D. Asay, Consumer Information Privacy and the Problem(s) of Third-Party Disclosures, 11 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 321, 330 (2013).
166. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (2006).
167. See Asay, supra note 165, at 341.
168. See Leslie Flint, California’s “Shine the Light” Marketing and Junk Mail Law, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE
(June 2005), https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/shine-light-marketers-find-out-how-they-knowyour-name.
169. See id.
170. See California S.B. 27, “Shine the Light” Law EPIC, https://epic.org/privacy/profiling/sb27.html (last
visited Dec. 13, 2019).
171. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Selected State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 13, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13463#isp.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id. (explaining that NCSL notes only three such states: California, Nevada, and Vermont).
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companies are exempt from this law if consumers are offered opt-in/opt-out
options.175 Therefore, state privacy statutes barely scratch the surface in
adequately protecting consumer’s privacy. The consumer is left virtually
unprotected in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions.176
Instead of comprehensive protection, the majority of states recognize privacy
torts such as: (1) intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs; (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity which places a person
in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of one’s name or likeness. 177
Some commentaries go so far as to claim that additional regulations would be
unduly burdensome, with little-to-no real privacy benefits provided to the
consumers.178 In contrast, some commentators and organizations argue that since
almost every state recognizes privacy torts these tortious based rights are therefore
the best hope for protecting consumer information privacy. 179 They support this
argument by highlighting the limitations of implementation at the socioeconomic
or technical levels.180
Unfortunately, as emphasized above, the advancement in technology and the
insistence upon third-party permissions and misguided developer practices,
imposes upon the consumer sharing expectations and reduces the options which a
consumer can assert in opposition. In environments such as this, consumers are
essentially left with no recourse at all.181 This is because, the standards currently
established are outdated182 and are not able take into account the increasing
advancements of technologies and how they affect information privacy. 183 For
example, Professor Asay emphasizes that “courts have been reluctant to recognize
privacy torts in cases where the information collected was publicly available or

175.

See id.
Consumer Privacy, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE https://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/consumer-privacy/(last
visited Dec. 13, 2019).
177. See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 422 (1960) (“It is evident from the foregoing that, by
the use of a single word sup-plied by Warren and Brandeis, the courts have created an independent basis of
liability, which is a complex of four distinct and only loosely related torts; and that this has been expanded by
slow degrees to invade, overlap, and encroach upon a number of other fields”.).
178. See Robert E. Litan, Balancing Costs and Benefits of New Privacy Mandates, in AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR.
FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, (1999) (“[P]olicy makers here should consider new privacy-related proposals. . . that
balances privacy interests on a case-by-case basis against the importance of ensuring the free flow of
information.”), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=179074.
179. See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 142 (2003).
180. Id. at 91–101.
181. Id. At 89–91.
182. Helen Nissenbaum, Deregulating Collection: Must Privacy Give Way to Use Regulation? 1 (May 1, 2017)
(unpublished
manuscript)
https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3092282.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3092282.
183. Id.
176.
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where a reasonable person would not be offended by the collection.” 184 In these
types of instances, however, the courts are neglecting the fact that database
technology can store thousands of confidential pieces of information about a
person in a profile, making it very easy for companies to share sensitive information
with third-parties.185
In some instances, courts have also adopted a view of consumer privacy
differentiated as public or private,186 where some information is voluntarily
public187 and other forms of information are viewed as private. 188 The ambiguity
between what is voluntarily private and public, however, is distorted as context
matters in most of these instances. Moreover, as Professor Asay interjects, privacy
torts rely on the concept of physical space to define expectations and harm. 189
Because of this viewpoint, “courts in applying privacy torts to the digitized world
have largely neglected privacy harm that does not fit neatly into the old
paradigm.”190 As a result, consumers are left to fend for themselves and even when
they discover a potential avenue to protect their privacy the outcomes often fail to
offer any true protection.
B.

Promising Legal Regulations

Over the last decade privacy regulation has changed markedly. Policymakers have
been forced to design privacy and data protection laws that are flexible to the
unforeseen advancements of technology. Most notably, the General Data
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) and CCPA are two globally impactful laws that are
creating sweeping changes toward consumers privacy rights. The GDPR, which
began enforcement last year, enhances data protection and privacy rights for
individuals within the European Union (“EU”) and European Economic Area (“EEA”).
Like the GDPR, the CCPA is an American law aimed at providing control of personal
data to California residents and will go into effect by January 1, 2020. Both
regulations provide the consumer with better means of control over their personal
data. The cascading impacts of both the GDPR and CCPA continue to change the
U.S. privacy law regime on a global scale, leading to numerous laws being passed
and multinational organizations elevating privacy to a board level issue. Privacy is
all over the media and it is hard to dispute the role that the GDPR and CCPA have
played in sustaining the privacy law conversation. Among tech companies, it has
become common knowledge that to ignore privacy is to risk reputation and leave
the organization in the competitive dark ages. Moreover, the regulations introduce
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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serious fines that companies must now consider with their data collection practices.
Furthermore, both laws present promising outcomes for the future of consumer
privacy rights.
1.

GDPR

The GDPR is a new data protection directive that builds upon the European Data
Protection Directive191 and implements new models of privacy and data protection
law. While the Data Protection Act previously sought out how personal information
was used by companies, government entities, and other organizations,192 the GDPR
now changes how personal information can be used. Individuals, organizations, and
companies who are defined as either “controllers” 193 or “processors”194 of personal
information are held accountable for their information collection practices,
including the requirement of the completion of a data protection impact
assessments and accurate explanations of how data is collected and processed. 195
Moreover, the GDPR requires concise and clear information to be provided about
consent, thereby requiring a “positive opt-in”196 option for the consumers.
Garnering the most attention are the provisions relating to the consumers ability to
request all information that a company holds about them197 and the “Right to Be

191. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J.
(L 281), 31–50.
192. Data
Protection
Act,
1998,
c.
29,
§
1,
(U.K.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/section/1/enacted.
193. EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 2016/679/EC, art. 3–4, 7–8 Recitals 2,
7, 8, 14, 22-–5 (explaining that the GDPR only protects natural persons (individuals) and does not cover legal
persons. A data controller is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body that determines
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data, alone or jointly with others. A controller is defined
by the fact that it establishes the means and purposes of the processing).
194. Id. at art. 4, 17, 28, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38 Recitals 90, 93 (explaining that the data processor is a natural
or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the
controller. Data processor activities must be governed by a binding contract or other legal act with regard to
the controller. The contract should set out the subject matter, duration, nature and purpose of the processing,
the types of personal data processed, the security measures, and the obligations and rights of the controller.
Processors can only process personal data on instructions from the controller. Upon termination of the
agreement with the controller, processors must return or destroy personal data at the choice of the controller.
In addition, if the processor wants to engage another processor (sub-processor) it has to have the written
authorization of the data controller).
195. See id.
196. Id. at art. 5–10, Recitals 39–48, 69, 70 (explaining that the GDPR provides data subjects with a right to
withdraw consent at any time as well as a right to object if their personal data is processed on the basis of
legitimate interest or performing of a task in the public interest); see GDPR Art. 21 Recitals 69, 70.
197. Id. at art. 12, 15, 20, 21 Recitals 59, 63, 64 (explaining that the GDPR states that, when responding to
an access request, a data controller must indicate the purposes of the processing; the categories of personal
data concerned; the recipients or categories of recipients to whom personal data have been disclosed to; and
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Forgotten” provision which requires a company to delete all information about an
individual upon request.198
Unlike other reviewed legislative enactments, the GDPR implements harsher
fines that empower regulators to enforce compliance.199 For example, the
Commission Nationale De l’informatique (“CNIL”), France’s data protection
regulator, issued a $56.8 million fine against Google for violating user’s “genuine
consent” standards.200 As can be seen, the penalties can run into the millions of
dollars and can include a penalty based upon worldwide revenue. 201
2.

California Consumer Privacy Act

The CCPA enhances privacy rights and consumer protection for California residents
as it applies to any business organization with annual gross revenues greater than
$25 million that does business in California.202 Under the CCPA, consumers have the
following rights: (1) the right to know what personal data is being collected about
them; (2) the right to know if their personal data is sold or disclosed; (3) the right to
know if their personal data is being sold, to whom it is being sold to; (4) the right to
deny permission of sale of their personal data; (5) the right to access their personal
data; (6) the right to access to equal service and price, regardless of whether they
exercise their privacy rights or not.203
According to the CCPA, personal data is any information that “identifies, relates
to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked,

any sources from which data was collected. The GDPR specifies that individuals also have the right to receive a
copy of the personal data processed about them).
198. Id. at art. 12, 17 Recitals 59, 65–66 (explaining that the scope of this right is not limited to the data
controller, but also impacts third parties, such as recipients, data processors and sub-processors that may have
to comply with erasure requests. This right can be exercised free of charge. There may be some instances where
a fee may be requested, notably when the requests are unfounded, excessive or have a repetitive character.
The GDPR specifies that data controllers must have in place mechanisms to ensure that the request is made by
the data subject whose personal data is to be deleted).
199. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 83, 84, Recitals 148-152, OJ
2016 L 119/1 (depending on the violation occurred the penalty may be up to either 2% of global annual turnover
or €10 million, whichever is higher; or 4% of global annual turnover or €20 million, whichever is higher. The
amount of the penalty may also vary depending on “the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement,” the
nature of the processing, the number of data subject affected, and the damages suffered, the negligent or
intentional character of the infringement, etc., with a complete list in Article 83(2) of the GDPR).
200. Emily Price, France Fines Google $57 Million For GDPR Violations, FORTUNE (Jan. 21, 2019),
http://fortune.com/2019/01/21/france-fines-google-57-million-for-gdpr-violations/.
201. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 at art. 83, 84, Recitals 148–152, OJ 2016 L 119/1.
202. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100-198.
203. Theodore Augustinos & Laura Ferguson, CCPA Guide: Are You Covered by the CCPA, JD SUPRA, (Jan. 15,
2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ccpa-guide-are-you-covered-by-the-ccpa-38771/.
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directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.” 204 The CCPA differs
from the GDPR in that the GDPR classifies consumer information as personal only.
In contrast the CCPA extends its definition to households.205 The GDPR also extends
to all EU citizens while the CCPA only extends to California residents. 206
Under the CCPA, consumers also have legal grounds to sue any businesses that
violate the bill.207 Businesses that violate the CCPA are fined up to $7,500 for each
intentional violation208 and $2,500 for each unintentional violation under Section
1798.155 of the Civil Code.209 Like the GDPR, the CCPA will have significant global
impact, given that California boast the world’s fifth-largest economy. Together, the
two regulations aim to guarantee individuals greater control over their personal
data, while providing the consumer with rights to have access to their information.
V.

L EGAL -T ECHNICAL S OLUTIONS

Consumers have become increasingly cautious about providing information to
companies, due to the prospect of companies misusing or mishandling their
sensitive information.210 With privacy rights becoming prioritized due to recent
regulation, companies have responded with joining privacy “seal” programs such as
“as TrustE,211 and privacy alliances such as the Online Privacy Alliance.212 These best
practices typically require companies to produce notices to consumers informing
them how the company collects information, how the company will use it, and what
type of third-parties will have access to consumer information. While these industry
practices seem reasonable and considerate to the consumer’s privacy, Professor
Asay states that there are two drawbacks to self-regulated industry practices:
adequacy and enforcement. 213 Companies possess a self-interest in retaining
flexibility with consumer information.214 Therefore, a company’s self-regulatory
approach often varies with effectiveness in providing consumers with adequate

204. BigID. CCPA Redefines Personal Information: Does Your Organization Know Its PI From PII? MEDIUM,
(Apr. 14, 2019), https://medium.com/bigid-on-id-privacy/ccpa-redefines-personal-information-does-yourorganization-know-its-pi-from-pii-f5ccc38db2a9 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140).
205. Sarah Hospelhorn, California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) vs. GDPR, VARONIS, (last updated Nov. 5,
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protection and control of their information. Self-regulation also relies on companies
regulating their own behavior,215 and not all self-regulating practices are created
equal.
Even companies who attempt to implement best practices with privacy
information struggle with providing consumers with adequate information control.
Self-Regulating practices are still plagued with ambiguous, blanketed legal language
and unidentified third-parties who can still utilize consumer information. 216 From a
consumer’s point of view, consumers receiving notice and choice should adequately
be supplied with who is receiving their information and how the company plans to
use it. Instead, consumers are presented with the general notice that unidentified
third-parties will legally receive and use personal information in manners
unknown.217 While self-regulation helps provide incentives for companies to
practice safe handling of privacy information, it still offers little control to
consumers in receiving appropriate knowledge of where their information is going
and how third-parties will use it.
In instances where self-regulation continues to leave consumers unprotected it
is likely time that more consideration is given to regulating portions of the data and
digital marketplaces. While widespread announcements of warnings, such as with
the newest issues surrounding FaceApp, 218 can be effective the release highlights a
potential solution that is often unexplored. The marketplace in which the app was
approved and released is in no way insisting upon any privacy or protections from
developers or third parties. One wonders how long the absence of a commitment
to self-regulation will continue to be ignored as a gap in governance–thereby
demanding regulation. Free or not, app environments are a marketplace, and thus
can be regulated as such. Individuals have demonstrated again and again that they
are unable, or unwilling, to gauge real harms. Nonetheless, regulation has long been
argued as an appropriate response to the harms. Of course, this regulation is only
the tip of the iceberg in terms of resolving harms suffered, yet this area is both ripe
for regulation and a good first step in addressing harms to both individuals and
other harms suffered by society in a digital eco-system.
Regulation in this area will likely be larger than the area addressed in this paper,
as the issues of notice, consent, and design are much wider issues. Without a doubt,
we should consider regulation which holds those in control of the marketplace to a
standard of safe product, in which the product is certified (and truly is) attentive to
privacy, consent, and notice. In addition, any attempt to regulate must be managed
via a polycentric approach, in which multiple agencies and individuals have the
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ability to enforce regulation and seek redress. Finally, there is mounting evidence
that individual designers wish to be given protections for revealing design and
deployments that violate the basic expectations of the users and society as a whole.
Accordingly, it is time that we support such disclosures through well designed
whistleblower protections.
A. Sociotechnical Solutions
In the absence of regulation imposing requirements, technology developers are
attempting to create technology driven solutions to address the harms suffered in
a digital marketplace. Notice Deficiency limitation has influenced technologists to
create devices that offer consumers easier methods of employing choice to privacy
notices. Professor Haddadi’s Databox proposed a piece of technology mitigating the
lack of choice prevalent from vague third-party disclosures found in policy
notices.219
The Databox offers the consumer a trusted platform that facilitates data
management, controlled access against other parties wishing to use consumer data,
and support incentive to both consumers and information collectors.220 The
Databox platform enables consumers to coordinate the collection of personal data,
while selectively controlling and monitoring their data for their own specific
purposes.221 It also employs three provisions that assist the consumer with these
controls: (1) legibility to inspect and reflect what data is being collected and how it
is processed, (2) agency to manage data and access it whenever the consumer sees
fit, and (3) negotiability to navigate the data’s social aspects with the interaction of
data subjects and the aligned policies.222 All of these control mechanisms are
developed and deployed through the components of MirageOS, Irmin, and Signpost
methodologies.
The Databox is simply providing a consumer the means to understand, control,
and negotiate access to the collection of their own data. Professor Haddadi’s
technology does not implement shortened privacy notices, but does empower the
consumer to be able to freely monitor and access the collection of their own data. 223
This piece of developmental technology becomes relevant due to the fact that
consumers are aware of where their data is going and how it may be used.224 While
the notice length hasn’t changed, consumers can potentially acknowledge what
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information third-parties have access to and where that information may be
traveling. The Databox remains in development.225
Further developments to privacy notice efficiency can be found in app design. 226
To mitigate the ongoing problem of privacy notice length, application designers are
creating fast-acting implementations that offer consumers shortened, summarized
versions of the privacy policies.227 These summarized versions of notices give the
consumer a chance to understand the agreement they are “consenting” to without
spending unreasonable amounts of time reading privacy notices they may not
understand. The app designers employ these design elements by addressing privacy
notices with a checklist to the consumer.228 The consumer is offered the privacy
notice in the form of summarized bullet-points that display relevant content about
privacy practices. The consumer is then offered a checklist to agree with each
summarized privacy practice.229
Following the checklist, the consumer is then immediately offered the chance to
enhance special privacy controls. These types of design applications not only make
privacy notices easy for the consumers to understand, but also allow the consumer
to have reasonable notice regarding data collection practices. Summarized policy
application features address the lack of control experienced by consumers and
provide the consumer with reasonable amounts of information that the consumer
can understand. These design implications are relevant to third-party disclosure
because they are reinforcing the willingness of the consumer to read the notices
provided since the information is of adequate length. Consumers are not burdened
by the feelings of helplessness, confusion, or anxiety that is typically generated by
the information overload found in traditional privacy notices. Instead, the
consumers receive a concise understanding of the information presented, with a
realistic overview that produces a chance for the consumer to make an appropriate,
educated decision with their personal data.
To mitigate the underlying lack of consumer choice in privacy notices, the
traditional means of documenting communication in commerce is being
superseded by multiple instances of electronic agreement, 230 rather than just one
singular signature agreement required by the user. In the view of some scholars,
225. See Amir Chaudhry et. al. Personal Data: Thinking Inside the Box, 1 AARHUS SERIES ON HUMAN-CENTERED
COMPUTING 4 (2015), https://tidsskrift.dk/ashcc/article/view/21312/19626.
226. See Vitaly Friedman, Privacy UX: Privacy-Aware Design Framework, SMASHING MAG. (Apr. 25, 2019),
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227. See id.
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documents are assessed to merely be containers. 231 Documents have always been
semantically boxed with large collections of information. The documents
themselves are not the most important properties to a consumer, but rather, the
content that lies within.232 While this observation is obvious, large collections of
information contained in a document make it challenging for relevant content to be
found. Instead of employing the traditional approach where the consumer signs an
entire document and thereby verifies all of the policy disclosures content to a thirdparty recipient, Professor Bull introduces a fragment extraction policy through the
use of privacy enhancing Content Extraction Signatures (“CES”). 233 Professor Bull’s
method enables consumers to view various portions of a privacy notice, where the
consumer may sign only the parts of the document he/she agrees with.
The standardization of CES empowers the consumer with reasonable choice. The
document is not verified by consumers in one signature and the blanketed optin/opt-out methods companies hide are more challenging to insert. The CES
method allows the consumers to be selective in what they are agreeing to and
providing some control in what they are signing.
B.

Personally Identifiable Information

Technological innovations that provide easier means of control and choice to
consumer’s privacy information will not be effective until federal and state laws are
adequately enforced. The current U.S. privacy regime is lacking sufficient
protections to consumer’s privacy and third-party disclosures are too loosely
regulated. Furthermore, laws requiring companies to provide sufficient notice and
choice to the consumers describing the intended third-party recipients and their
collection uses must be introduced. Consumers must also be uniformly entitled to
privacy as a right with options of recourse to protect their privacy interests under
the law.
Currently suggested proposals only apply to PII that companies collect and offer
to third-party recipients.234 Companies do not aggregate, anonymized information
(“non-PII”).235 There is an unclear notion that third-party recipients could easily use
non-PII to cause consumers potential objective privacy harms. These concerns
extend to the possibility of re-identification.236 For instance, a study involving a
group of 10,000 anonymized twitter users were successfully re-identified using a
“Supervised Learning Algorithm.” This algorithm was able to re-identify the
231.
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anonymized twitter users with 97.6% accuracy. 237 Despite industry efforts to
properly anonymize consumer information, computational programs were still able
to re-identify these records with accuracy and could potentially aggregate and repurpose such information.238 As demonstrated in this study, anonymization
techniques still remain in early development and don’t guarantee identity perfect
anonymization to consumers’ data. Since the risks of objective privacy harm are
more challenging to access with non-PII, the manner in which non-PII is governed
should be regulated differently.239
Additionally, since subjective privacy harm is sometimes unavoidable, and harms
vary to the levels of extreme sensitivities, legitimate issues that show subjective
harm are much harder to address. As previously mentioned, Professor Asay argues
that in order for subjective harm to be legitimate, objective privacy harm must also
be a potential possibility.240 As such, he asserts that arguably this “type of harm is
unavoidable and results more from the extreme sensitivities of a few than a
legitimate issue needing redress.”241 The elements of this discussion assess non-PII
as information that cannot be reversed engineered or linked back to consumers. 242
Following on in this argument, Professor Asay argues that one underlying issue
of privacy is the clarity of what constitutes PII. The EU Directive defines “personal
data” in broad terms:
Personal data shall mean any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to
an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.243
This interpretation suggests that personal data may not be necessary to identify
a person from related information, under the premise that information is relatable
to an identifiable person. For many legislators, the definition of PII is too broad. The
California Data Security Breach Act attempts to narrow PII by clarifying personal
information as the name of an individual who is associated with multiple forms of
sensitive information.244 While the California law does offer a specific definition, the
237. See Herman T. Tavani & Frances S. Grodzinsky, Responding to Some Challenges Posed by the Reidentification of Anonymized Personal Data, 2019 COMPUTER ETHICS – PHIL. ENQUIRY (CEPE) PROCEEDINGS. See also
Beatrice Perez et al., You are your Metadata: Identification and Obfuscation of Social Media Users using
Metadata Information, 2018 ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.
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interpretation only addresses certain types of objective privacy harms. A legislative
proposal addressing both extremes of privacy harms that could impact consumers
must be offered to effectively regulate privacy. 245 Consequently Professor Asay
asserts, “the definition thus focuses the model law on the two forms of privacy
harm”246 thereby rejecting excessive detail while respecting the existing definition
of PII.247
In further discussion of PII, there are some instances where third-party
disclosures should not be applicable to legal solicitation. For example, Professor
Asay argues “the law should not apply to government actors pursuing PII as part of
an investigation.”248 Instead “the law should only apply if the company disclosed
the PII to the third party for a secondary use of the information: a use beyond the
purposes for which the individual provided the PII.” 249
Subsequently, legal scholars have proposed that the definition of the term
“personally identifiable information” should also encapsulate more static digital
identifiers. Additional digital identifiers could extend toward GPS coordinates,
Android ID’s, and unique device identifiers as being definitively included as PII and
not solely interpreted as such.250 According to Professor McAllister, a more
contextual definition is needed to take into account static digital identifiers as being
characterized as “personally identifying” when the “particular recipients” of the
data are likely to identify a consumer.251 This would mean that courts would be
forced to more directly consider the full extent of particular disclosures.252 The
definition would focus more on the specific recipient and question the ability to
identify a user issue based on the “particular” digital identifier. 253 Thus, courts
would be more focused on the discovery to be assessed with the identification
question. With such changes, courts would have a better understanding of when
the statutory definition applies in the discovery identification process.
The suggested definitions to PII provides legislators with a clear explanation of
delimiting third-party intent. In the defined instances, interpretation of PII is taking
into consideration the initial flow of information taken in by companies and setting
appropriate guidelines to the transfer of use by third-party recipients. The definition
also addresses privacy harms in specific manners that are not too broad. By
reassuring consumers that their PII is disclosed for their own consented purposes,
245. Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Director for Management, Office of Management and
Budget, to the heads of the of the Executive Departments and Agencies, at 1, n. 1 (May 22, 2007).
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and not to unrelated third-party recipients, the instance of subject privacy harm is
likely reduced. Objective privacy harm would also be reduced because fewer thirdparty recipients would be eligible to collect PII in their systems.
C.

Legislative Reconstruction

Under the condition that Personally Identifiable Information is definitively adopted
in the scope of law in the manner previously suggested, policy remedies could
effectively be implemented to empower the consumer with control and choice.
Such policy remedies should also resemble the standards imposed in the “Shine the
Light” law and the rights provisioned by the CCPA at the national level. The FTC
could stipulate provisions that require companies to provide consumers with a
third-party recipient list before a company shares PII with its third-party vendors.
Moreover, such provisions would provide the consumer with simple means of
tracing the involvement of other companies who may be collecting their personal
information.254 A third-party recipient list requirement, would also provide the
consumer with a more reasonable degree of notice that is accessible and not buried
in vague third-party disclosure language.
Furthermore, a provision requiring third-party recipients in short, summarized
forms could also be included and be concurrent to third-party lists. The FTC could
work with industries to develop these summaries to provide the most relevant
description of information sharing practices and apply such practices to app
transparency. By doing so, the harmonization of policy languages between
information-sharing practices of the company and the consumer are mutually
comprehensible.255 These standards provide consumers with enhanced opportunity
to limit the spread of their information, while limiting privacy harms that could
occur from the unknown use of their personal data.
Specifically, in the app markets, companies that host apps and dictate developer
requirements could also require app developers to list their ad library packages in
similar fashion to the way Dangerous Permissions are already listed in the
applications descriptions in the Google Play Store. Such simple means of
transparency would provide the consumer with a reasonably accessible means of
understanding what parties are involved in the background collection of their data
when using a mobile application. Furthermore, states should collectively adopt
standards similar to the “Shine the Light” California law and provisioned rights of
the CCPA. App developers are not required by law to list Third-Party involvement
or provide consumers with access rights in their applications and will not willing do
so until regulation requires such practices.
Forty-nine out of the fifty states do not require companies to provide consumers
disclosure of information with their information-sharing practices or a list of
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companies they share consumers information with for advertising purposes. 256 As
long as companies provide consumers with an opt-in or opt-out option, companies
are not required by law to disclose the third-parties with which a company shares
or may share consumer PII. If states uniformly adopted legislation similar to
California’s “Shine the Light Law,” companies would be held to standards that
adequately provide the consumer the chance to receive notice and at least have
some sort of choice before providing their consent.
Globally, it is deemed an impossible task to reasonably track the flow of
consumer information transferred from one party to another. It is unrealistic and a
waste of resources, effort, and time to try and pursue such an endeavor. The way
in which proper privacy control and notice can be adequately provided to the
consumer is through the adoption of national privacy law as opposed to the mixture
of state-by-state privacy legislation and sectoral law. The best way to empower
individuals with proper control and notice to personal information is through the
refinement of U.S. privacy laws that regulate technological practices at scale. Laws
such as the GDPR and CCPA, force refinement of industry standards and present
enough regulatory enforcement incentives–ensuring that tech firms take the
requirements of the law seriously.
While the GDPR and CCPA are by no means perfect, these types of privacy
regulations are the correct steps forward and they force businesses to comply if
they want to conduct business in these specific jurisdictions. Similar principles to
the GDPR need to be adopted nationally if we are to create a society that still
respects the right to privacy.
C ONCLUSION

Within the mobile ecosystem, applications are collecting personal information that
violate consumer privacy expectations. In these instances, most applications
operate as over-privileged to their core function(s). Many applications in both iOS
and Android operate as over-privileged, by way of their third-party services
embedded in their source code. While these third parties are often times
benevolent, there is no notification provided to the consumer to notify who is
collecting or what is being transferred. Even worse, there are severely limited
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protections for U.S. citizens to have a choice or any control over their personal
information.
Additionally, companies do not offer reasonable notice or choice in privacy
disclosures that adequately inform their consumers about their information-sharing
practices. This article has identified these problems in legislation, multiparty
involvement, privacy harms, disclosure formatting, and policy language that is
inaccessible to the reasonable understanding of the average consumer. The current
U.S. approach to privacy information remains ineffective in providing the consumer
with appropriate levels of protections or choice of who can collect their personal
information and how it will be used. Consumers continue to lack virtually any kind
of real control over their collection of their information.
As a result of this lack of control, consumers face subjective and objective privacy
harms with very few options for legal recourse. Consumers willingly surrender their
privacy to third parties with insufficient information regarding who receives their
personal data and for what purposes it is used. Companies continue to blanket
third-party involvement with opt-in/opt-out options and excessive policy lengths
that render consumer notice impossible to reasonably understand. With respect to
third-party disclosures, legislation is too loosely regulated and will need to be
remedied before any kind of adequate notice and choice can be presented to the
consumer.
Technological tools and legislative remedies offer options and the possibility for
reasonable notice and choice in the app environment, however, until government
makes the effort to enact effective information privacy laws current to the digital
information age, these potential solutions will only remain useful suggestions. The
right to privacy will only continue to erode as information technology becomes
progressively more advanced. The traditional approach to information-sharing
practices has been proven to be ineffective and will remain so until legislation is
current and flexible with technological capabilities, resembling the GDPR directive.
An unorthodox approach to consumer protection and collective legislation flexible
with technological advancements of permissions will need to be adopted globally if
consumers have any hope of controlling their information. Until that change is
actively pursued, the disparity of consumer’s personal information lays unbound by
the unrestricted spread of multiparty collection in the mobile environment.

106

Journal of Business & Technology Law

